Studies on Securing a Ceasefire in Ukraine and Their Consideration of Potential Russian Violations - drawing particularly on OSCE experiences

In recent years, particularly as the Russia-Ukraine war enters its fourth year in 2025, several significant studies have emerged examining the complex challenge of securing a sustainable ceasefire in Ukraine. These analyses vary in their approaches but share a common concern: Russia's documented history of violating previous agreements raises serious questions about how to design a ceasefire that can withstand potential large-scale violations.

The most comprehensive recent analysis comes from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), which published a detailed "Swiss army knife of options" for achieving a sustainable ceasefire in Ukraine in February 2025. This 31-page document represents one of the most thorough proposals to date, illustrating how rapidly ceasefire planning has shifted from theoretical discussions to practical considerations[1][7]. It is authored by an eminent OSCE expert, Dr Walter Kemp with oversight by the former OSCE Secretary- General Ambassador Thomas Greminger. 

But it should be immediately added that this study provides a framework for the analysis of the requirements of a viable cease-fire without proposing solutions to several key problems relating to security guarantees and political agreements. 

Indeed, a search of the various studies quoted below gives the answer that  monitoring missions, regardless of size, cannot prevent a determined Russian offensive without broader security guarantees and international consequences for violations.

The GCSP toolkit acknowledges Russia's history of violating ceasefires and proposes several mechanisms to mitigate this risk. These include establishing a buffer zone approximately 10-15km wide along the ceasefire line, deploying an international monitoring and verification mission, and creating a Joint Military Coordination Commission (JMCC) to enable military-to-military contacts between the parties[1].

Regarding potential Russian violations specifically, the GCSP analysis recommends an international monitoring force of approximately 15,000 personnel including military, police, and civilian components. This would include rapid-reaction units (about 5,000 personnel) stationed in the rear with the capacity to respond to violations. However, the toolkit explicitly acknowledges that such a force would be insufficient to stop a determined Russian offensive, noting: "An interposition force along a blue line separating two powerful armies would require hundreds of thousands of troops with a peace enforcement mandate; this is unlikely and dangerous"[1].

The GCSP study emphasizes that the monitoring mission's effectiveness would depend on both parties' commitment to honor the ceasefire. It notes that company-sized reconnaissance units would primarily monitor the ceasefire line, equipped with armored vehicles, helicopters, UAVs, and night vision equipment, but their function would be monitoring rather than enforcement[1].

## The SWP Study on Ceasefire Models

A separate analysis from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) takes a more robust approach to preventing Russian violations. This study argues that given the size of the Russian military presence (approximately 600,000-700,000 soldiers), a much larger Western military deployment would be necessary to provide a credible deterrent[14].

The SWP paper suggests that approximately 150,000 Western troops would be needed for a credible deterrent, stationed behind the ceasefire line in "pockets" with mobile capabilities. The study acknowledges this is currently "illusory" given resource constraints but argues that smaller deployments like the "tripwire forces" proposed by France would only be credible if substantial reinforcements were readily available[14].

## Historical Violations and Ukrainian Concerns

Ukrainian skepticism about Russian adherence to any ceasefire agreement is well-documented. President Volodymyr Zelensky has provided U.S. President Donald Trump with a list documenting 25 ceasefire violations by Russia since 2014[3][11]. This history significantly shapes Ukrainian reluctance to accept a ceasefire without robust security guarantees.

The Kyiv Independent reported that after Russia invaded Ukraine's east and annexed Crimea in 2014, Moscow violated multiple ceasefire deals. For example, following the signing of the Minsk Protocol (Minsk-1) on September 5, 2014, Russian troops allegedly fired at Ukrainian positions at least 10 times within 24 hours after the ceasefire was declared. Similarly, Minsk-2 in February 2015 reportedly lasted only minutes before violations occurred[2].

## The Carnegie Endowment Analysis

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published research in February 2025 specifically examining lessons from the failed Minsk Agreements to inform potential future ceasefire arrangements. This analysis focuses on the security and policy risks of an armistice, highlighting how the Minsk process de-escalated but failed to end hostilities or prevent the 2022 invasion[16].

The Carnegie analysis characterizes the Minsk Agreements as "fruits of Russia's coercive diplomacy" and suggests that any future ceasefire must address the fundamental weaknesses of that process, particularly regarding verification and enforcement mechanisms[16].

## Assessment of Russian Military Intentions

A critical factor in evaluating potential Russian violations is understanding Russia's strategic intentions. The Institute for the Study of War published an assessment in February 2025 arguing that Putin is unlikely to demobilize in the event of a ceasefire because he fears the domestic political consequences of veterans returning to Russian society. This suggests Russia might maintain substantial military capacity along the ceasefire line even after an agreement[8].

The Moscow Times reported in March 2025 that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova rejected proposals for a temporary ceasefire, claiming Ukraine would "use this pause, with the help of its allies, to strengthen its military potential." This position indicates Russia's own concerns about Ukrainian military preparations during a ceasefire period[17].

## Technical Monitoring and Verification Considerations

Most studies recognize the importance of technology in monitoring potential violations. Alexander Hug, who led ceasefire monitoring efforts in Ukraine from 2014-2022, noted that "human monitors and the use of technology cannot compensate for the shortcomings of imperfect agreements or the lack of political will"[1].

The GCSP toolkit recommends using UAVs, fixed cameras, satellite imagery, infrared and night vision equipment, and radar to supplement human monitoring. However, it emphasizes that technology should be regarded as a complement to, rather than a replacement for, human patrols[1].

## Security Guarantees Beyond Monitoring

A common theme across studies is that ceasefire monitoring alone is insufficient without broader security guarantees for Ukraine. The GCSP toolkit recommends linking a ceasefire to a political settlement and suggests bilateral security assurances between Ukraine and allied countries could "increase respect for a ceasefire and bolster the sovereignty of Ukraine"[1].

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated that "security guarantees" are essential for any ceasefire. As Zelensky told Trump during their February 2025 meeting, "We will not agree to a ceasefire without security guarantees. A document is not enough. We need a strong army"[2].

## Current Diplomatic Context

The immediate diplomatic context shapes how these studies are being received. Recent reporting indicates that Trump is pushing for a swift end to the war and has halted the supply of arms and intelligence to Ukraine, potentially weakening Ukraine's position in any negotiations[17]. Meanwhile, France and the UK have proposed deploying thousands of their troops to Ukraine after a ceasefire, though Russia has not indicated willingness to accept such a contingent[7].

Some European powers are exploring linking a ceasefire to consequences for violations. According to Financial Times reporting in March 2025, France, Germany, and the UK are considering mechanisms to seize over €200 billion in frozen Russian assets if Moscow violates a future ceasefire agreement[12].

## Civilian Protection Considerations

A Stockholm University Institute study raises an important but often overlooked dimension: a ceasefire would not necessarily stop human rights violations against Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories. The report warns that Russia's ability to complete a systematic population exchange (forcing Ukrainian citizens to accept Russian passports or face deportation) could actually increase under a ceasefire scenario[13].

## Conclusion

The various studies examining how to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the challenges involved, particularly regarding potential Russian violations. They generally acknowledge that monitoring missions, regardless of size, cannot prevent a determined Russian offensive without broader security guarantees and international consequences for violations.

The history of previous ceasefire violations looms large in these analyses, with Ukrainian skepticism well-founded based on documented patterns since 2014. The most robust proposals suggest that preventing Russian violations would require not just monitoring but a substantial Western military presence, linking ceasefire violations to concrete consequences (such as asset seizures), and embedding the ceasefire within a broader political settlement addressing Ukraine's security needs.

What emerges clearly from these studies is that technical monitoring solutions alone are insufficient without addressing the fundamental political and security dynamics of the conflict. As the GCSP toolkit notes, "Without a political settlement, a ceasefire will merely be a temporary cessation of hostilities"[1].

Sources
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